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Oklahoma Advance Directive Act: Denying Choice to
Those Who Cannot Choose — A Proposal for Legislative
and Practical Alternatives*
I. Introduction: Who Can Speak for the Incapacitated in Oklahoma?
The State of Oklahoma designates end-of-life decision-making authority in
the Advance Directive Act (ADA).1 A person may always make her2 own
end-of-life decisions if she has the ability to decide, or capacity, to do so.3 The
situation is more complex, however, when the person lacks capacity to make
such decisions, as demonstrated by the situation of Terri Schiavo.4 Where a
person lacks capacity, the ADA allows for several means of end-of-life
decision making. The first statutory method allows a person, the declarant, to
make her own end-of-life decisions in advance through the creation of a
Living Will.5 To establish the Living Will, the declarant need only complete
the relevant section in the statutory form entitled Advanced Directive for
Health Care (ADHC).6 The second statutory method allows a person, the
principal, to designate a Health-Care Proxy (Proxy), the agent, to make
decisions in the principal’s place.7
The principal may also execute a document known as a Durable Power of
Attorney (DPOA), which appoints an agent with the ability to make healthcare decisions for the principal.8 If the principal is incapacitated, however, the
agent may only make decisions if the grant of authority in the DPOA fulfills

* The author would like to thank Professor Michael Winchell, Lloyd McAlister, and
Wendy McMahon for their thoughtful suggestions during the development and writing of this
article. The author would also like to thank his wife and family for their continual love and
support.
1. 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3101.1-.16 (2001 & West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess.).
2. Feminine pronouns will be used as inclusive of both genders for the sake of brevity.
3. Act of May 17, 2006, ch. 171, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 729, 735 (to be codified at
63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(A)).
4. See generally Schiavo v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). Schiavo was an
incapacitated woman from Florida who required the artificial administration of food and water
to live. Schiavo’s parents challenged, unsuccessfully in the end, her spouse’s efforts to remove
the life-sustaining treatment. This case drew widespread attention, both from the media and the
federal government, and brought end-of-life decision-making issues to the forefront of the
national discourse.
5. See Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (to be codified at 63
OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 738.
8. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 1072 (2001).
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the conditions of a Proxy appointment.9 The agent must make these decisions
according to the wishes of the principal, if such are known.10 The Living Will
is considered to be authoritative evidence of such desires, if the principal has
one.11 If the principal has not executed a Living Will, other evidence of the
principal’s decisions may be utilized.12 If the principal’s desires for the
situation are unknown, the agent must make the decision in her best
reasonable judgement, taking into account the “values of the declarant and
what the wishes of the declarant would be based upon those values.”13
If a person does not utilize one of the statutory means of making end-of-life
decisions after incapacitation, the ADA “creates no presumption concerning . . .
the use, withholding, or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.”14 Under the
Oklahoma Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act, however,
every incompetent patient is presumed to have directed her health care providers
to provide her with life-sustaining hydration and nutrition.15 Therefore, despite
the lack of a “presumption” in the ADA, the likely outcome is that an individual
who does not have an ADHC or another allowed method will continue to receive
life-sustaining treatment, regardless of her actual wishes.16
At first glance, Oklahoma seems to have developed a comprehensive and
flexible plan for individuals to either make or delegate end-of-life decisions.
Nevertheless, there are two major problems with the Oklahoma ADA and the
statutory ADHC that it provides. This note will analyze the Oklahoma ADA
and propose legislative revisions while also detailing methods that legal
practitioners should apply to increase the ADHC’s current usefulness to
clients. Part II of this note surveys the history of the ADA, both in the
national arena and more directly in Oklahoma. After tracing its statutory
evolution, Part III will examine the two major deficiencies of the ADA, its
lack of clarity and its lack of flexibility, and analyze the impact those
9. Id. § 1072.1(B)(1)(b).
10. Act of May 17, 2006, § 15, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 744 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.16).
11. Id. § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 739 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
12. Id. § 15, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 744 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.16).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 11, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 742 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT.
§ 3101.12(D)).
15. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3080.3 (2001).
16. See David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1280-81 (1994)
(discussing the substantial likelihood that physicians will override even the known wishes of
a patient if the physician believes the unrequested treatment to be in the patient’s best interest).
If physicians sometimes will continue treatment, despite the known wishes of a patient to
discontinue that treatment, the treatment will almost certainly be continued when the physician
does not know of any particular wish of the patient.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/6

2006]

NOTE

451

deficiencies may currently have on citizens of Oklahoma. In addition, Part IV
will provide proposals the Oklahoma legislature should use in reforming the
ADA. Lastly, Part V will discuss some current methods legal practitioners
should employ to compensate for the deficiencies in the ADHC.
II. How We Got Here: Arriving at the ADA
The Oklahoma ADA has roots extending as far back as the English
common law.17 In order to understand how the statute has come to exist in its
present form, it will be necessary to take a closer look at the statute’s
background. First, this part will examine the evolution of the rights at stake,
with particular emphasis accorded to constitutional rights. Second, this part
will survey the nationwide attention given to those rights. Lastly, this part
will closely analyze the particular evolution of the Oklahoma law on this
subject.
A. Balancing Rights: An Individual’s Autonomy and Privacy vs. the State’s
Interest in Preserving Life
In the common law tradition, “even the touching of one person by another
without consent and without legal justification was a battery.”18 This concept
of bodily integrity extended to the requirement of informed consent prior to
application of medical treatment.19 Therefore, any nonconsensual medical
care was a battery and was hence illegal.20 Carrying this formulation to the
next logical step indicates that a person can refuse even lifesaving medical
attention.21 In other words, a person could choose to die by refusing medical
care. This legal principle presupposed the ability of the individual to make the
decision whether to consent to medical care.22
The seminal case discussing the right to refuse treatment in light of an
individual’s incapacity is In re Quinlan.23 Leaving aside the common law
tradition of informed consent, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
incapacitated individual had a right of privacy under the United States
Constitution to terminate treatment.24 Because this right of privacy exists as
17. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 270.
22. Id. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914))
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body . . . .” (emphasis added)).
23. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
24. Id. at 663.
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an unwritten constitutional doctrine, and is not absolute, the court balanced it
against the state’s interest in preserving life.25 The court held that the state’s
interests in preserving the sanctity of human life and the professional
autonomy of physicians were insufficient in comparison with the individual’s
right of privacy, noting particularly that the state interest weakened as the
diagnosis worsened and the required treatment increased.26 The court then
concluded that “[t]he only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is
to permit the guardian and family of [the individual] to render their best
judgement . . . as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.”27
Despite the In re Quinlan court’s novel constitutional interpretation, most
courts continued to reference the common law doctrine of informed consent
in right to refuse treatment cases.28 Some courts applied both the doctrine of
informed consent and the constitutional right of privacy.29
The United States Supreme Court examined these issues in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.30 When an individual became
incapacitated in Missouri, the state required clear and convincing evidence of
the person’s intent in order for a surrogate to exercise the individual’s right to
refuse treatment, specifically nutrition and hydration, on the individual’s
behalf.31 Missouri had also enacted a Living Will statute as a procedural
safeguard in the surrogate decision-making process.32 The Supreme Court
held that this evidentiary requirement was a valid exercise of the state’s
interest in preserving life.33 The individual’s assumed right to refuse
25. Id. at 663-64.
26. Id. at 664.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.
1985) (basing the holding solely on the doctrine of informed consent). One important result of
basing such decisions on the doctrine of informed consent is that the individual’s ability to
reject medical treatment is subject to state regulation as it alters the common law. See Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (recognizing the state’s right to compel
clear and convincing evidence as a procedural requirement). If the decisions were based on the
constitutional right of privacy, states might not be able to exercise the wide discretion they now
currently enjoy in this issue. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expanding right of privacy
to include woman’s choice to terminate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (expanding right of privacy to include issues of contraception).
29. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977). The U.S. Supreme Court assumed such a right in Cruzan. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
279.
30. 497 U.S. 261.
31. Id. at 280, 282.
32. Id. at 268. For the text of the Missouri statute, see MO. REV. STAT. § 459.010-.055
(2000).
33. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
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treatment through a surrogate was not overly burdened by the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence of her intent.34 The Court found that the
standard of proof functioned to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree
of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication,”35 and “serve[d] as a
‘societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between
the litigants.’”36 In other words, the higher standard of proof is permissible
given the heightened importance of the issues at stake, namely the life of an
incapacitated individual. Announced in 1990, this decision was issued against
a backdrop of various contemporary state statutes concerning end-of-life
decision making. The following addresses the nationwide attention given to
these issues.
B. Nationwide Attention
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws passed
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Uniform Rights Act) in 1985.37
This act was modified by the version enacted in 1989.38 The first of the two
main revisions to the Uniform Rights Act allowed a declarant to appoint an
agent to make decisions regarding whether to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining treatment.39 The second revision allowed a list of other people, in
priority order, to consent to the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining
treatment, even without a declaration by the qualified individual.40 These acts
foresaw the rise of end-of-life decision making as a national issue and
provided the basic plan by which many states addressed the subject of the
right of privacy in death. Moreover, these acts helped shape the requirements
for the exercise of that right. Several states adopted the 1985 version of the
Uniform Rights Act.41 Six jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, substantially
adopted the 1989 version.42 Twenty-six other jurisdictions, while not adopting
34. Id. at 283.
35. Id. at 282 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
36. Id. at 283 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982)).
37. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1985), Historical Notes (repealed 1989),
9C U.L.A. 339 (2001).
38. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989), Historical Notes, 9C U.L.A. 311
(2001).
39. Id. § 2, 9C U.L.A. 318-20.
40. Id. § 7, 9C U.L.A. 328-29.
41. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1985), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act
Has Been Adopted, 9C U.L.A. 339. The six states are Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Missouri,
Nebraska, and North Dakota. Id.
42. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act
Has Been Adopted, 9C U.L.A. 311. The six jurisdictions are Montana, Nevada, Ohio,
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either version of the Uniform Rights Act, have adopted either a living-will or
natural-death statute.43 The remainder of the states have either adopted the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act or some other legislation authorizing the
use of an ADHC.44
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan, a significant number of
states enacted legislation on the issue of life-sustaining treatment.45 Due to the
expanding legal issues at stake, however, the legislation was “fragmented,
incomplete, and sometimes inconsistent.”46 Therefore, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted a new statute,
the Uniform Health-Care Decision Act (Uniform Decisions Act), in 1993.47
This statute was intended to clear up the interstate legislative confusion and
allow for a nationwide approach.48 Unfortunately, only eight states enacted
the Uniform Decisions Act, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the national
approach.49 Consequently, the real task of understanding a state’s laws on
end-of-life decision making must entail analyzing the state statutory scheme
and history.
C. Oklahoma’s Efforts
Oklahoma’s first attempt to require evidence of an individual’s intent with
regard to end-of-life decision making was called the Oklahoma Natural Death
Act (Natural Death Act).50 Enacted in 1985,51 this statute was even more
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. See generally Oklahoma Rights of
the Terminally Ill or Persistently Unconscious Act, ch. 114, 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 364
(codified as amended at 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1301.1-.16 (2001 & West, Westlaw through 2006
2d Reg. Sess.)).
43. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989), Adoption of Other Living Wills or
Natural Death Acts, 9C U.L.A. 313. The twenty-six jurisdictions are Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id.
44. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 84 (2005).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id., Historical Notes, 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 83.
48. Id., Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 84.
49. Id., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 83. The
eight states are Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, and New
Mexico. Id.
50. See 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3101-3111 (1991), repealed by Oklahoma Rights of the
Terminally Ill or Persistently Unconscious Act, ch. 114, § 20, 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 364, 375.
51. Oklahoma Natural Death Act, ch. 64, 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 223 (codified as amended
at 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3101-3111 (1991)).
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limited than Oklahoma’s present provisions. An individual’s ADHC was only
effective if she “qualified.”52 The Natural Death Act defined qualification as
the period when an individual was terminally ill and had communicated the
existence of the ADHC to medical personnel.53 An individual was terminally
ill if she was going to die within hours or days.54 The Natural Death Act made
no provision for individuals in a persistent vegetative state. Furthermore, the
act did not provide for a Proxy of any kind.
Procedurally, the Natural Death Act required the declarant to additionally
and specifically sign the portion of the document relating to the withdrawal
of nutrition and hydration and to have the ADHC notarized.55 The instructions
recorded in the ADHC were considered dispositive of the declarant’s wishes
if the declarant had executed the document after she became qualified under
the Natural Death Act.56 If the document was executed prior to qualification,
then the instructions in the ADHC were only to be considered as evidence of
the declarant’s wishes.57 The medical personnel were also required to confirm
the instructions in the ADHC with competent patients.58 According to the
Natural Death Act, there was no presumption about a person’s wishes outside
of what was recorded in the ADHC.59
In 1992, Oklahoma enacted the Rights of the Terminally Ill or Persistently
Unconscious Act (RTIPUA), which was largely an adoption of the 1989
version of the Uniform Rights Act, though it bore some differences.60 The
first major difference between the RTIPUA and the Uniform Rights Act was
the definition of “terminal condition.” The RTIPUA defined terminal
condition as “an incurable and irreversible condition that, even with the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the
attending physician and another physician, result in death within six
months.”61 The Uniform Rights Act (1989), by contrast, defined a terminal
condition as “an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the

52. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3103(D).
53. Id. § 3102(7).
54. Id. § 3102(8).
55. Id. § 3103(C)-(D).
56. Id. § 3107(C).
57. Id. § 3107(D).
58. Id. § 3107(B).
59. Id. § 3110(A).
60. Oklahoma Rights of the Terminally Ill or Persistently Unconscious Act, ch. 114, 1992
Okla. Sess. Laws 364 (codified as amended at 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1301.1-.16 (2001 Supp.
2005)).
61. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3 (2001) (emphasis added).
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attending physician, result in death within a relatively short time.”62
Changing the requirement that death occur within “a relatively short time” to
requiring death within “six months” seemed to indicate a broader class of
individuals to whom the statute would apply.
On the other hand, the differences in the RTIPUA also indicated the
Oklahoma legislature’s desire to limit the applicability of the statute.
Requiring that death occur within the time frame of six months, “even with the
administration of life-sustaining treatment,”63 seriously reduced the class of
individuals to whom the statute would apply, because in order to die while
receiving life-sustaining treatment, an individual would need to be far more
ill than an individual who would die soon without such treatment. Further, the
requirement that two doctors agree on the diagnosis, though most likely a wise
provision, limited the applicability of the statute to individuals about whom
two medical professionals can agree. Lastly, even the time frame of six
months demonstrated a legislatively imposed outer limit on who could qualify
under the RTIPUA.
Other differences between the RTIPUA and the Uniform Rights Act also
merit mention. The RTIPUA added the concept of “persistently unconscious”
as another triggering condition for the ADHC, which widened the
applicability of the document.64 Conversely, the RTIPUA limited the
declarant to declaring her wishes solely through the ADHC.65 The Uniform
Rights Act allowed declarants to designate another individual to make those
decisions.66 As a result of these changes, the RTIPUA significantly modified
the statutory form to include a persistently unconscious provision, a Proxy
section, and a provision governing the result of a conflict between the decision
of the Proxy and the instructions in the Living Will.67 Lastly, the RTIPUA
omitted the Uniform Rights Act provision of a priority list for who may give
consent if the individual in question has not made a declaration of intent.68
This exclusion limited the applicability of the RTIPUA to those individuals
who had made an effective declaration, as compared to the potential
applicability of the Uniform Rights Act to anyone, whether she had made a
declaration or not. Overall, the RTIPUA diminished the flexibility and
62.
added).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
(2001).

UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989) § 1, 9C U.L.A. 316 (2001) (emphasis
63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3.
Id.; see also 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4 (Supp. 1994) (amended 1995).
63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.16 (2001).
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989) § 2, 9C U.L.A. 319-20 (2001).
63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4 (2001).
See generally UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989) § 7, 9C U.L.A. 328-29
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applicability of the Uniform Rights Act, while extending its provisions to the
persistently unconscious.
The RTIPUA was amended three times between 1992 and 2003.69 The first
amendment, enacted in 1995, added a section to the ADHC allowing for
specific organ donation and mandating that medical professionals unwilling
to provide the declarant’s requested treatment provide such treatment pending
transfer to a willing provider.70 The 1998 amendment added a requirement
that transfer of a patient to a willing physician is required if the current
attending physician is unwilling to comply with the declarant’s instructions
in the ADHC.71 The 2003 amendment changed the signature lines on the
ADHC to initial spaces and updated the year on the form from “19__” to
“20__.”72
The amendments prior to 2004 were relatively minor. In 2004, however,
Oklahoma made major changes, especially to the ADHC.73 The Living Will
section was completely reformatted.74 The section was broken into two parts,
with one covering life-sustaining treatment generally and the other covering
nutrition and hydration specifically.75 Additionally, the 2004 amendment
significantly altered the Proxy section by removing the declarant’s instructions
to the Proxy.76 These instructions had previously contained essentially the
same questions as the Living Will section, but were specifically directed to the
Proxy.77 Most importantly, the 2004 amendment removed the provision that
allowed the declarant to indicate whether her wishes should control in case
those wishes conflicted with her Proxy’s decision in a particular

69. See Act of May 26, 2003, ch. 270, 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws 1102; Act of Apr. 28, 1998,
ch. 164, 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws 511; Act of Apr. 13, 1995, ch. 99, 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 388.
70. Act of Apr. 13, 1995, ch. 99, §§ 1-2, 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws at 390-92 (codified at 63
OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4 (2001); id. § 3101.9 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998)).
71. Act of Apr. 28, 1998, ch. 164, § 1, 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws at 512 (codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.9 (2001)).
72. Act of May 26, 2003, ch. 270, § 1, 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws at 1103-06 (codified at 63
OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B) (Supp. 2003) (amended 2004)).
73. See Act of Apr. 27, 2004, ch. 166, 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws 754.
74. See id. § 1, 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws at 754-56 (codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B)
(Supp. 2005) (amended 2006)).
75. Id. The 2006 amendment to the RTIPUA rendered these changes to the ADHC moot.
See infra text accompanying note 86.
76. Act of Apr. 27, 2004, ch. 166, § 1, 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws at 756-57 (codified at 63
OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B) (Supp. 2005) (amended 2006)).
77. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B) (Supp. 2003).
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circumstance.78 This removal and its potential ramifications are discussed in
detail below.79
In 2006, Oklahoma amended the RTIPUA again, changing the act’s name
to the Advance Directive Act (ADA) and making four significant alterations.80
The first change was the addition of a new triggering situation — the endstage condition, which is defined as “a condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness, which results in severe and permanent deterioration indicated by
incompetency and complete physical dependency for which, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, treatment of the irreversible condition would be
medically ineffective.”81 Secondly, the amendment provides that a declarant
who has been diagnosed as pregnant may refuse treatment through the ADHC
if she “specifically authorized, in her own words, that during a course of
pregnancy, life-sustaining treatment . . . shall be withheld or withdrawn.”82
Thirdly, the amendment provided a standard for physicians making
determinations under the ADA.83 The standard provides that, “the physician
shall use his or her best judgment applying with ordinary care and diligence
the knowledge and skill that is possessed and used by members of the
physician’s profession in good standing engaged in the same field of practice
at that time, measured by national standards.”84
The 2006 amendment’s most important change, however, was a complete
revision of the ADHC.85 The form now presents the end-of-life decisions
organized by triggering situation, as opposed to a life-sustaining treatment

78. Act of Apr. 27, 2004, ch. 166, § 1, 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws at 757 (codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.4(B) (Supp. 2005) (amended 2006)). The deleted provision read as follows:
IV. Conflicting Provision
I understand that if I have completed both a living will and have appointed a
health care proxy, and if there is a conflict between my health care proxy’s
decision and my living will, my living will shall take precedence unless I indicate
otherwise.
__________________. _____________
(initials)
Id.
79. See infra Part III.A.1.
80. Act of May 17, 2006, ch. 171, §§ 3-15, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 729, 733-44 (to be
codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3101.1-.4, .8-.16)
81. Id. § 5, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 734 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3(4)).
82. Id. § 7, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 740 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.8(C)).
83. Id. § 9, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 741-42 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT.
§ 3101.10(B)).
84. Id.
85. See id. § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735-40 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT.
§ 3101.4(C)).
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section and a nutrition and hydration section.86 There are three options
presented under each triggering situation: (1) refusing life-saving treatment,
but accepting hydration and nutrition; (2) refusing life-saving treatment,
hydration, and nutrition; and (3) accepting life-saving treatment, hydration,
and nutrition.87 Each triggering situation section also has an option pointing
the reader to a fourth section, wherein the declarant may set out more detailed
instructions.88 The instructions for this section inform the declarant that she
may describe individual triggering situations or provide more specific
instructions regarding the pre-defined triggering situations.89 The amendment
also includes a statement in the Proxy section that provides that a declarant
deliberately declines to appoint a proxy by not appointing a Proxy in that
section.90 Having thus examined the history of the present ADA, the analysis
of the statute itself may proceed.
III. The Denial of Choice: Limitations of the ADHC
Legal decisions, particularly those in the context of end-of-life decision
making, must be made in an adequate manner. Adequacy in end-of-life
decision making refers to two goals. The first goal of adequacy is objective
effectiveness, or in other words, ordered decision making. To achieve
objective effectiveness, the decision must allow the individual to obtain the
result she intended. The second goal is legal validity. To achieve legal
validity, end-of-life decisions must conform to the evidentiary and procedural
requirements established by law. These goals form the basis of an adequate
legal decision in the end-of-life context.
Clarity and flexibility are the minimum requirements for adequate decision
making, or in other words, achieving the goals of objective effectiveness and
legal validity.91 First, the individual must be able to understand the situation
86. Id., 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 736-37.
87. Id., 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 736-38.
88. Id.
89. Id., 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 738.
90. Id.
91. See Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic
Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 357 (1991) (discussing the perfect legal
decision as having precise clarity and flexibility); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush
v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2002) (discussing
the respective benefits of clarity and flexibility in legal decision making); Steven L. Schwarcz,
A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA.
L. REV. 909, 928-33, 989 (1995) (identifying clarity and flexibility, among others, as two prime
constraints on the legislative decision-making process); Robert Ziff, For One Litigant’s Sole
Relief: Unforeseeable Preclusion and the Second Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 92324 (1992) (recognizing the tension between clarity and flexibility, but also acknowledging the
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that requires the decision and the choices available to her. Others must then
be able to understand the individual’s decision in the context of that situation.
These requirements relate to the element of clarity. Clarity furthers the goal
of objective effectiveness by permitting the individual to express her choice
accurately and by allowing those implementing the individual’s decision to
interpret her choice. Clarity also furthers the goal of legal validity by ensuring
that the decision conforms to the legal requirements and will be understood
by those in authority.
Secondly, the individual must have valid legal options that reflect her range
of choice. This requirement relates to the concept of flexibility. Flexibility
furthers the goal of objective effectiveness by allowing the individual to make
a decision that reflects her choice. If the range of available legal choices does
not include what an individual desires, the decision is not objectively effective
as to that individual. Flexibility also furthers the goal of legal validity, though
in an indirect fashion by furthering the element of clarity. The more options
that are presented to an individual, the greater the range of choice will be.
Consequently, the individual will be able to more accurately select an option
that reflects her choice. This increased clarity furthers both goals of adequate
decision making as discussed above.
As the analysis below demonstrates, the Oklahoma ADA is deficient in
both clarity and flexibility. As a result of these deficiencies, Oklahomans are
required to make critical decisions without the aid of the clarity and flexibility
necessary to make the decisions in an adequate manner. First, citizens of
Oklahoma must contend with the lack of clarity in the ADA, which reduces
both the individual’s ability to understand the nature of the life-and-death
issues at stake and the communicative value of the decision between the
individual and those in authority. Secondly, citizens are confronted by a
narrow, or inflexible, range of options regarding substitute decision makers.
This lack of flexibility limits the ability of the individual to make the legal
decision that accurately reflects her desire in that situation. These two
deficiencies are examined in detail in the following analysis.
A. Clarity in Language
One of the two major deficiencies of the ADA is lack of clarity. This part
will analyze the statute’s clarity in two areas: (1) the standard of capacity, and
(2) the definition and application of the triggering situations.

need to balance the two components of decision making).
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1. Standard of Capacity
The first area in which the ADA is unclear centers on the standard of
capacity, or lack thereof, required for the instructions in the ADHC to become
operative. The ADA provides that an advance directive becomes operative
when “1. [i]t is communicated to the attending physician; and 2. [t]he
declarant is no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of lifesustaining treatment.”92 Under the ADHC form, the individual’s “attending
physician and another physician” are responsible for “determin[ing] that [the
individual is] no longer able to make decisions regarding [her] medical
treatment.”93 This formulation is not defined in the ADHC itself, nor in the
remainder of the ADA.94 Several issues stem from this construction.
First, it is unclear what standard the two physicians are meant to use to
determine whether an individual can make decisions regarding her medical
treatment. This standard could range from a complete lack of cognitive
activity to even the most minor degree of temporarily reduced capacity.
Further, an individual might make decisions against her best interests. The
Oklahoma legislature has not given any guidance as to what standard of
capacity physicians should use in these situations.95 This lack of a standard
forces physicians to be influenced by other motivations, such as fear of
liability, in making their decisions whether to honor a declarant’s ADHC.96
92. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.5(A) (2001).
93. Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (emphasis added) (to be
codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
94. The ADA defines a “qualified patient” as a declarant “determined to be incapable of
making an informed decision regarding health care, including the provision, withholding, or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, by the attending physician and another physician who
have examined the patient.” Id. § 5, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.3(10)). This definition, however, only clarifies what the physicians must
determine insofar as it adds a descriptive term — the decision must be “informed.” The
definition is still minimal in spite of this adjective.
95. The ADA does offer a standard for physicians in making decisions, but does not
specifically guide the physicians in regard to determining capacity. See id. § 9, 2006 Okla. Sess.
Laws at 741-42 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.10(B)).
96. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 329, 354 (1999) (discussing the legal and financial interests as potential motivations for
medical staff to disregard declarants’ wishes); Adam M. Milani, Better Off Dead than
Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a “Wrongful Living” Cause of Action When Doctors Fail
to Honor Patients’ Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 167-69 (1997)
(identifying and discussing fear of liability and desire for less control over professional actions
as reasons for physicians’ failure to honor advance directives); Orentlicher, supra note 16, at
1280-99 (discussing evidence demonstrating that physicians override patients’ wishes and
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If the physician does not honor the ADHC, the document’s effectiveness is
negated. This particular shortcoming is remedied somewhat by the fact that
an individual who still has some measure of decision-making ability would be
able to communicate her desires. Whether those wishes are followed is
another matter altogether.
The second issue this “standard” raises is what test of capacity a subsequent
judicial body might use. In the same way that physicians must make this
determination without a clearly articulated standard of capacity, a judicial
body would likely have difficulty in determining such a question in any
consistent manner.97 A determination of capacity is generally a question of
fact,98 but the court could apply a different standard of capacity than the
medical personnel and come to the opposite conclusion. Because of the
subsequent judicial uncertainty, the determination of capacity by the doctor
may also be uncertain and unreliable for the purposes of removing lifesustaining treatment. Thus, the lack of clarity concerning the standard of
capacity negatively impacts the doctor-patient relationship in regard to the
objective effectiveness of the individual’s decision. Furthermore, the
uncertainty potentially could result in the misapplication of an ADHC, thus
negating its legal validity and effectiveness as well.
2. Triggering Situations
The second area where the ADA is unclear is the definition of the
triggering situations. The ADHC comes into effect when the declarant can no
longer make decisions about her treatment.99 By its own terms, however, the
ADHC only applies to three specified situations: (1) a declarant with a
terminal condition, (2) a declarant who is persistently unconscious, and (3) a
identifying fear of malpractice and desire to maintain professional authority, among others, as
potential motivations).
97. The Oklahoma Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act does provide a
standard of clear and convincing evidence for judicial determination of whether an individual,
when competent, made a decision to refuse treatment. See Act of May 17, 2006, § 2, 2006 Okla.
Sess. Laws at 732 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3080.4(A)(2)). Nevertheless, this
standard also does not explain how the court should determine competency.
98. See 58 OKLA. STAT. § 41 (2001) (providing that testamentary capacity is a question of
fact for the trial court); In re Estate of Sneed, 1998 OK 8, ¶ 9, 953 P.2d 1111, 1115 (holding
that whether a testator had testamentary capacity is a question of fact); In re Guardianship of
Campbell, 1966 OK 99, ¶ 8, 450 P.2d 203, 210 (Lavender, J., concurring) (noting that a ward’s
mental capacity is a question of fact, but not a question raised in the case); Girdner v. Girdner,
1959 OK 50, ¶ 26, 337 P.2d 741, 746 (holding that the capacity to execute a deed is a question
of fact); Russell v. State, 1974 OK CR 194, ¶ 6, 528 P.2d 336, 339 (holding that the question
of whether a criminal defendant lacks the capacity to commit a crime is one of fact).
99. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.5(A)(2) (2001).
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declarant with an end-stage condition.100 A terminal condition is defined as
“an incurable and irreversible condition, that, even with the administration of
life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending physician and
another physician, result in death within six months.”101 Persistently
unconscious is defined as “an irreversible condition, as determined by the
attending physician and another physician, in which thought and awareness
of self and environment are absent.”102 An end-stage condition is defined as
“a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which results in severe and
permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and complete physical
dependency for which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, treatment
of the irreversible condition would be medically ineffective.”103
These three definitions are the only aid that the ADA gives to physicians
and to subsequent legal tribunals in determining when the ADHC should be
effective. Unfortunately, there is no existing caselaw in Oklahoma regarding
the meaning of these phrases. These definitions, though potentially broad and
flexible, may have drawbacks. First, the definitions of these qualifying
conditions, while perhaps articulated as specific medical concepts, may hold
little meaning for the layperson. Without clarification, declarants may not
understand the qualifying conditions in the same manner as the legislature.
More importantly, declarants may not understand the qualifying conditions in
the same manner as the physicians applying the definitions. This potential
breakdown in the understanding of these terms could have drastic
consequences for declarants whose lives may hinge on this interpretation.
With issues of this magnitude, certainty in meaning of terms is vital for
effective communication via the ADHC.
100. See Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 736-37 (to be codified at 63
OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(C)). Prior to the 2006 amendment, the effectiveness of the ADHC was
predicated on a declarant having one of two triggering conditions — a terminal condition or
persistent unconsciousness. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3(10) (2001). The amendment’s addition
of the “end-stage condition” was presumably made in response to a recent Oklahoma attorney
general opinion. The Oklahoma Attorney General had stated that the statute was
unconstitutional because it limited the ability to refuse treatment to declarants with terminal
conditions or persistent unconsciousness. 36 Okla. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 06-7, ¶¶ 14-25 (Apr. 6,
2006), 2006 WL 981042. The statute did not permit a declarant with an incurable but
nonterminal disease, such as Alzheimer’s disease, to refuse treatment through her ADHC. Id.
The 2006 amendment directly addressed this concern by adding a third triggering situation, the
end-stage condition. Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 737 (to be codified
at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(C)); see also id. § 5, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 734 (to be codified
at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3(4)).
101. Act of May 17, 2006, § 5, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.3(12)).
102. Id., 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 734 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3(7)).
103. Id. (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.3(4)).
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Secondly, even though physicians are granted statutory immunity for
actions “in accord with reasonable medical standards,”104 they may still face
certain negative consequences for allowing an individual to exercise her right
to refuse treatment through the ADHC. The protection may not apply if it is
determined that the physician did not act within reasonable medical standards.
Even if the protections do apply, potential negative consequences might
include frivolous lawsuits or disciplinary inquiries. A narrow interpretation
of the triggering terms would limit the number of individuals for whom the
ADHC is effective. The fewer the number of individuals exercising their right
to refuse treatment through the ADHC, the less of a chance that a physician
will face negative consequences. This is especially true because the ADA
does not provide a penalty for physicians who continue to treat individuals
who have an effective ADHC.105 Instead, physicians who are unwilling to
comply with a declarant’s instructions in her ADHC must arrange to transfer
care of that patient to a physician who is willing to comply with the
declarant’s instructions.106 Despite that provision, the reality is that doctors
may err on the side of caution because the ambiguous definitions of the
triggering conditions give them the leeway to protect themselves.
B. Flexibility with Substitute Decision Makers
The second major deficiency of the ADA, in addition to the lack of clarity,
is its inflexible treatment of substitute decision makers. This part will address
the statute’s flexibility with respect to three areas: (1) the ability of declarant
to grant true decision-making authority to her Proxy, (2) the ability of the
declarant to grant current authority to her Proxy, and (3) the lack of a
provision of substitute decision makers for nondeclarants.
1. Granting Decision-Making Authority to the Proxy
The first area in which the ADA is inflexible involves the ability of the
declarant to grant meaningful decision-making authority to her Proxy. One of
the major changes included in the 2004 amendment was the removal of the
“Conflicting Provision.”107 The pre-2004 ADHC allowed the declarant to
indicate whether the instructions of the Living Will or the decision of the
Proxy should “take precedence,” if the instructions in the Living Will differed

104. Id. § 9, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 741 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.10(B)).
105. See id. § 10, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 742 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT.
§ 3101.11).
106. Id. § 8, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 741 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.9).
107. Compare 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B) (Supp. 2003) with 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B)
(Supp. 2005).
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from the decision of the Proxy.108 Though not explicitly stated, the removal
of this provision seems to indicate that the Proxy has no discretion whatsoever
and must solely carry out the declarant’s instructions regarding life-sustaining
treatment as indicated in the Living Will.
This lack of discretion on the part of the Proxy is in direct conflict with
section 3101.16 of the ADA. This section states:
An individual making life-sustaining treatment decisions . . . for a
declarant shall make such decisions based on the known intentions,
personal views and best interests of the declarant. If evidence of
the declarant’s wishes is sufficient, those wishes shall control. If
there is not sufficient evidence of the wishes of the declarant, the
decisions shall be based on the reasonable judgement of the
individual so deciding about the values of the declarant and what
the wishes of the declarant would be based opon those values.109
The tension between these sections might be relieved if the declarant did not
complete the Living Will portion of the ADHC, but did appoint a Proxy.
Then, presumably, there would be insufficient evidence of the declarant’s
wishes and the appointed Proxy would have to make a decision according to
the standards detailed above. Also, assuming that a completed Living Will is
sufficient evidence of the declarant’s wishes, it would seem the Proxy would
not have discretion.
Nonetheless, the tension is not fully relieved by these considerations
because of the nature of the ADHC as a document. The ADHC can be
characterized generally as a forecasting tool for health-care decisions.110
Making decisions in advance is commendable, but an individual cannot
foresee all future events and situations. The situations covered by the ADHC
are arguably specific, but even within those categories, there is room for a
108. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B) (Supp. 2003). See supra note 78 for the text of the
conflict resolution provision.
109. Act of May 17, 2006, § 15, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 744 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.16).
110. Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s Say?, 89 KY. L.J.
327, 355 (2001) (stating “[a]ny kind of advance directive addresses future situations and
attempts to anticipate the decisions that those situations will require”); see also Lorraine M.
Bellard, Restraining the Paternalism of Attorneys and Families in End-of-Life Decision-Making
While Recognizing that Patients Want More than Just Autonomy, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 803,
805 (2001) (discussing the problems of using the ADHC as a predictive tool); Rebecca Dresser,
Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823,
1836, 1845 (2003) (discussing the problems of using the ADHC as a predictive tool). Though
the latter two articles take a negative view of the ADHC’s ability to function as a predictive tool,
they speak of it as such.
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myriad of scenarios. Simply initialing one of three options cannot possibly
convey what the declarant would wish in each of those slightly varied
situations. The possibility of a situation arising that the declarant did not
consider does exist. In such a situation, the declarant’s actual wishes might
contradict the instructions she gave in the ADHC. This is where the
conflicting provision would allow a declarant to vest the final decision-making
authority in a person, as opposed to a document. Obviously, the person
appointed as Proxy will not be infallible, but she will have the flexibility to
examine the situation from the present, instead of in the distant and perhaps
unforeseeable future.
2. Granting Current Authority to the Proxy
The second area in which the ADA is inflexible is the ability of the
declarant to grant current authority to her Proxy. The authority of the Proxy
is conditioned on the effectiveness of the ADHC.111 In other words, if the
ADHC is not effective yet, the Proxy has no authority to make decisions on
behalf of the declarant. As previously noted, the ADHC becomes effective
upon a determination that “the declarant is no longer able to make decisions
regarding [her own medical treatment].”112 For the sake of brevity, this
determination will be referred to as “incapacity” for the remainder of this
section.
The ADHC limits the Proxy’s authority to when the declarant is
incapacitated. Facially, this limitation would seem logical and obvious. Why
would the declarant need someone to make decisions if she could make those
decisions for herself? The difficulty is not in the limitation itself, but rather
in the lack of choice the limitation implies. An individual may only care to
appoint a substitute decision maker for situations after she is incapacitated.
Oklahoma allows the individual to take this action through the appointment
of a Proxy.
Alternately, another individual may want to appoint a substitute decision
maker for situations both before and after incapacity. If this latter individual
wishes to appoint different individuals for each respective time period, the
current state of the law meets her needs. Oklahoma does provide a way for an
individual to appoint a substitute decision maker who would have authority
prior to incapacity. This provision requires a separate grant of authority under

111. Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 738 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.4(C)) (“If my attending physician and another physician determine that I am no
longer able to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct my attending physician
. . . to follow the instructions of _________, whom I appoint as my health care proxy.”).
112. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.5(A)(2) (2001).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/6

2006]

NOTE

467

the DPOA provision.113 If the latter individual wishes to appoint the same
individual for both before and after incapacity, the current state of the law
requires her either to execute both a DPOA and a ADHC naming the same
person,114 or to execute a DPOA that conforms to the requirements of the
Proxy grant.115 While an attorney-in-fact under a DPOA grant can crossfunction as a Proxy, a Proxy cannot serve both functions.116 This
inconsistency demonstrates the inflexibility of the ADA.
3. Substitute Decision Makers
The third area in which the ADA is inflexible is the lack of provision for
substitute decision makers for nondeclarants. The ADA only mentions
nondeclaring individuals in two sections. Section 3101.12 indicates that the
ADA “creates no presumption concerning the intention of an individual who
has revoked or has not executed an [ADHC] with respect to the use,
withholding, or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.”117 The other mention
occurs in section 3101.2, which states that “the proper role of the court is to
settle disputes and to act as the proxy decision-maker of last resort when no
other proxy is authorized by the individual or is otherwise authorized by
law.”118 Because the ADA does not create a presumption regarding the
nondeclarant’s wishes, the statute appears to indicate that a nondeclaring
individual’s wishes must be determined by the decision maker of last resort —
the court. This reading is supported by the fact that Oklahoma law does not
provide another means by which an individual can appoint a decision maker
for decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment, thereby rendering moot the
allowance for a decision maker “otherwise authorized by law.”119
Despite the current statutory provision, there may be other individuals, such
as family members, who have knowledge of the nondeclarant’s wishes
regarding life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, these knowledgeable
individuals may care deeply about ensuring that the nondeclarant’s wishes are
carried out. By not providing for “otherwise authorized” decision makers,
113. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 1072 (2001).
114. This would be required if the individual did not construct the DPOA grant to conform
to the Proxy requirements, as required by title 58, section 1072.1(B)(1)(b) of the Oklahoma
Statutes for an attorney-in-fact to make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment.
115. In this case, the grant would conform to the requirements of section 1072.1.
116. Neither the ADA nor the DPOA provision currently allows the grant authorizing a
Proxy to also imbue that individual with DPOA-authority.
117. See Act of May 17, 2006, § 11, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 742 (to be codified at 63
OKLA. STAT. § 3101.12(D)).
118. Id. § 4, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 733 (emphasis added) (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.2(A)(3)).
119. See id.
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Oklahoma has effectively silenced the only individuals that might have
knowledge of the nondeclarant’s desires. Moreover, the state has rendered
silent anyone who currently lacks capacity to execute an ADHC or who loses
such capacity prior to the execution of an ADHC. In contrast, authorization
of nonappointed individuals as substitute decision makers is not foreign to
Oklahoma law. In fact, in section 3102A of the ADA, Oklahoma provides that
“a legal guardian, attorney-in-fact with health care decision authority, or a
family member” may give informed consent to experimental treatment in
certain circumstances.120 The section then goes on to provide a list of such
family members, in priority order.121
If these family members can give informed consent to experimental
treatment, the rationale for preventing them from making decisions regarding
life-sustaining treatment for nondeclarants is unclear. The decisions are
related, as both regard exceptional medical situations and the acceptance or
rejection of treatment. Moreover, the provision for otherwise authorized
decision makers is within the ADA itself. This placement indicates there is
a place for such decision makers in the field of treatment decisions. On the
other hand, the decisions can be distinguished. Consent to experimental
treatment is attempting to preserve life, whereas decisions regarding lifesustaining treatment may hasten death. That distinction may justify
preventing nonappointed individuals from making such decisions, even though
they might know the nondeclarant intimately. Some, though not all,
nondeclarants may benefit from the exclusion of nonappointed individuals.
Despite this protection for some nondeclarants, the ADA imposes silence on
interested individuals, both the nondeclarants and their families, who should
have a voice, although perhaps not the final say.
IV. Where to Go from Here: Suggestions for Legislative
Correction of the ADA
Having analyzed the clarity and flexibility of the ADA and ADHC, the
deficiencies discovered deserve further attention due to the complicated nature
120. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3102A(A) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
121. The list is as follows:
XX1. The spouse, unless the patient has no spouse, or is separated, or the spouse
is physically or mentally incapable of giving consent, or the spouse’s location is
unknown or the spouse is overseas, or the spouse is otherwise not available;
2. An adult son or daughter;
3. Either parent;
4. An adult brother or sister; or
5. A relative by blood or marriage.
Id.
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of the questions involved and the gravity of the subject matter. First, this part
will discuss reasons why the legislature should take action to correct these
problems. Second, this part will suggest potential legislative solutions.
A. The Importance of Legislative Correction
Many of the previous problems identified for legislative correction of the
ADA and ADHC could be accomplished by means of individuals modifying
the existing form by adding instructions. After all, the statute only requires
the ADHC to be “in substantially the following form.”122 Nevertheless, two
reasons counsel against relying on individuals to modify the form on their own
and necessitate uniform legislative revision. This part will examine those two
reasons briefly.
First, there is widespread public dissemination of the ADHC form.123 No
doubt, this is partially due to the recent publicity this issue has seen.124
Accordingly, many individuals are acquiring and filling out the ADHC
without the benefit of legal counsel. While an individual may not need
counsel to answer the questions asked by the form, she may need counsel to
understand what the questions are asking. It would be irresponsible to assume
that all citizens who acquire and execute an ADHC on their own comprehend
all of the legal questions and standards at stake. Since it is unlikely that all
individuals will seek legal assistance for purposes of executing the ADHC, the
form should be as simple and “user-friendly” as possible. The most effective
way to keep the ADHC “user-friendly” for all potential declarants, regardless
of representation by counsel, is for the legislature to revise it in a uniform
fashion for the entire state.
Second, a statutory form should be universally utilized. In other words, the
ADHC should be relatively uniform across the board. This is needed because
medical professionals must be able to analyze the declarant’s end-of-life
wishes quickly and accurately. If everyone has modified forms, the
interpretive task becomes much more difficult. Whether the modifications
come from attorneys or from the individuals themselves, the result is the same.
122. Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
123. The ADHC is available from various public entities and services, usually through an
organization’s website. See, e.g., Caring Connections, National Hospice and Palliative Care
Organization, Oklahoma Advance Directive, http://www.caringinfo.org/files/public/Oklahoma.
pdf (last visited June 22, 2006); Oklahoma Bar Association, Advance Directive for Health Care,
http://www.okbar.org/public/brochures/advanced3.pdf (last visited June 22, 2006); Oklahoma
Department of Human Services, Advance Directive for Health Care, http://www.okdhs.org/
aging/Documents/87-07W.pdf (last visited June 22, 2006).
124. See generally Richard Jerome, What to Do About Terri, PEOPLE, Feb. 14, 2000, at 77.
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Instead of one statutory form for everyone, everyone will have her own form
based loosely on the statutory ADHC. Instead of this unnecessary diversity,
if the ADHC was corrected, only minor modifications would have to be made,
and greater uniformity and ease of interpretation would result. Thus, to keep
the interpretive task simple for medical personnel, the Oklahoma legislature
should revise the ADHC so that individuals will not need to modify the form.
B. Clarity in Language
The first major deficiency of the ADA is a lack of clarity. Clarity is
important to achieve the goals of objective effectiveness and legal validity.125
Clarity furthers these goals by enabling the individual to understand the
situation that calls for the decision and the options the decision presents.
Clarity also enables the individual to effectively communicate her decision
and allows others to correctly interpret her choices. There are two main areas
in which this lack of clarity is present and can be improved by legislative
revision: (1) the standard of capacity and (2) the definition and application of
the triggering conditions.
The first area in which the ADA is unclear is the level of decision-making
ability, or mental capacity, an individual must have or lack to render the
ADHC operative. As discussed previously, the ADA’s guidance on this
matter is marginal.126 The Oklahoma legislature could resolve this ambiguity
by setting out a more detailed standard of capacity in these situations. Though
the Uniform Rights Act and the Uniform Decisions Act use the same
formulation as the ADA in the ADHC,127 all parties concerned would benefit
from a clearly defined standard of capacity, especially one that is susceptible
to judicial review and comment.
One option for the legislature would be to use the definition of “capacity”
in the Uniform Decisions Act, which provides, “‘Capacity’ means an
individual’s ability to understand the significant benefits, risks, and
alternatives to proposed health care and to make and communicate a healthcare decision.”128 This definition has the benefit of being tailored specifically
to the situation of life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, the definition
contains more factors and elements of the decision-making process to interpret
than the current standard set forth in the ADHC.129 The proposed solution
125. See supra Part III.
126. See supra Part III.A.1.
127. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989) § 2, 9C U.L.A. 319 (2001); UNIF.
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(c)-(d), 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 93 (2005).
128. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 1(3), 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 89.
129. Maine and New Mexico have expanded even further on the Uniform Decisions Act
definition. Id. § 1, Action in Adopting Jurisdictions, 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 91-92. Maine’s version
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would allow medical professionals the ability to make principled decisions
honoring declarants’ wishes.
In addition, if the Uniform Decisions Act standard of capacity was
incorporated into Oklahoma’s ADA, judicial bodies reviewing a determination
of capacity made by medical personnel would have a tangible starting point.130
Because capacity is a question of fact,131 courts will review the question of
capacity independently of the medical personnel’s evaluation.132 Regardless
of whether the review is independent, the use of a clearly defined standard of
capacity would provide a known foundation for judicial review of the medical
determination. Because this standard would also apply to judicial
determinations of capacity, the determination made by medical personnel
would become more certain and reliable for the purpose of removing lifesustaining treatment.
The second area in which the ADA is unclear is the meaning and
interpretation of the triggering conditions. There are three primary methods
by which this ambiguity might be clarified. First, the Oklahoma legislature
could define the terms more narrowly and specifically. A narrow definition
of the triggering conditions, however, would limit the flexibility of the ADA
provides:
“Capacity” means the ability to have a basic understanding of the diagnosed
condition and to understand the significant benefits, risks and alternatives to the
proposed health care and the consequences of foregoing the proposed treatment,
the ability to make and communicate a health care decision and the ability to
understand the consequences of designating an agent or surrogate to make healthcare decisions.
Id., 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 92. Although it is unclear whether the additional language establishes
a higher or lower standard of capacity than the Uniform Decisions Act formulation, the Maine
version does provide more factors to consider in interpreting the definition. Whether the
additional factors are beneficial is questionable, but either provision is superior to the current
lack of a definition of “capacity” in the Oklahoma ADA.
130. For discussions of various judicial standards of capacity from both statutory and
common law origins, see William M. Altman et al., Autonomy, Competence, and Informed
Consent in Long Term Care: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1671,
1678-85 (1992); Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards
of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 360-62 (1996); and
Samantha Weyrauch, Comment, Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: Who Decides and
by What Standards?, 35 TULSA L.J. 765, 784-85 (2000). The Oklahoma legislature should be
able to avoid the entire question by using a well-defined standard of capacity in the ADA and
making it applicable to medical personnel as a medical determination and to the courts in the
form of a question of fact.
131. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
132. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 556-557 (2001) (providing that questions of fact will be tried
to the fact finder, whether the fact finder is the court or the jury, as provided in other substantive
law).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

472

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:449

and ADHC by denying the declarant any opportunity to indicate her personal
wishes.
The 2006 amendment used a second option, which emphasized the
declarant’s ability to define the triggering conditions in the fourth subpart of
the Living Will section in the ADHC. This subpart now allows declarants to
“describe other conditions in which [they] would want life-sustaining
treatment or artificially administered nutrition and hydration provided,
withheld, or withdrawn.”133 This provision has great potential to allow the
declarant to specifically indicate situations in which she would want the
instructions in the ADHC to become operative. The legislature could further
emphasize this possibility by indicating that the interpretation of the triggering
conditions is delegated to the doctor by default, but that the declarant can
supplement that interpretation with specific information, if she chooses to do
so. This solution maintains the document’s flexibility, while ensuring that
declarants understand that the document can be personalized to suit their
individual wishes. On the other hand, this option allows declarants to define
the triggering conditions in potentially less helpful terms than the existing
definitions. Declarants might use nonmedical terminology or overly
generalize their wishes. Medical professionals would then have to interpret
and apply these inarticulate definitions. Furthermore, such an allowance for
declarant-drafted terms would drastically reduce the uniformity of the ADHC,
making the interpretive task much harder for medical personnel.
A third and, perhaps, more effective option would be for the legislature to
provide a series of specific, identified conditions that the declarant could
select if she wished to make it the triggering condition of the ADHC. This list
of conditions could include recognized terminal illnesses and conditions and
different states of cognitive awareness. This solution has the benefit of
uniformity because every ADHC would have the same finite list of conditions
for medical personnel to interpret. Moreover, the declarant would have the
ability to personalize the document to reflect her wishes regarding triggering
conditions, while still maintaining the clarity necessary for interpretation.
C. Flexibility with Substitute Decision Makers
The second major deficiency of the ADA is a lack of flexibility. Flexibility
serves to further the goals of objective effectiveness and legal validity.134
Flexibility furthers these goals by allowing the individual to choose an option
that embodies her desire in the situation. There are three main areas in which
133. Act of May 17, 2006, ch. 171, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 729, 738 (to be codified at
63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
134. See supra Part III.
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this lack of flexibility is present and can be improved by legislative revision:
(1) the ability of a declarant to grant decision-making authority to her Proxy,
(2) the ability of the declarant to grant current authority to her Proxy, and
(3) the lack of a provision of substitute decision makers for nondeclarants.
The first area in which the ADA is inflexible is the lack of provision for
resolving conflict between the instructions in the Living Will and the Proxy’s
decision about the declarant’s wishes. This problem could be easily resolved
by reinserting the conflict provision that the 2004 amendment removed.135
This solution would preserve the presumption that the instructions in the
Living Will control, while also allowing the declarant to choose whether her
Proxy can have the final say, thereby increasing the flexibility of the ADHC.
The second area in which the ADA is inflexible is the inability of the Proxy
to make decisions prior to the determination by medical professionals that the
declarant cannot make decisions for herself. This problem could be remedied
by looking to the Uniform Decisions Act, which provides a clause indicating
when the grant of authority to the Proxy becomes effective.136 The default
setting is that the grant becomes effective only after the declarant cannot make
decisions. However, the Uniform Decisions Act, by means of a check box,
permits the declarant to indicate whether the grant becomes effective
immediately. The inclusion of this option would preserve the presumption
that the Proxy’s authority springs from the declarant’s inability to make her
own decisions, but would give the declarant flexibility to have a current
substitute decision maker.
The third area in which the ADA is inflexible is the lack of provision of
decision makers for nondeclarants. A statutory revision in this area is
especially important because only the legislature can remedy this situation.
A nondeclarant cannot receive the benefit of a substitute decision maker
except by becoming a declarant. While that may appear to be an easy
solution, some individuals may currently lack capacity to appoint a substitute
decision maker, and other individuals may lose such capacity prior to making
an appointment. These individuals are silenced unless concerned individuals
take their cases to the court. Although the ADA has made the court the

135. See supra note 78 for the text of the conflict resolution provision.
136. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 4, 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 101 (2005). The clause
states: “My agent’s authority becomes effective when my primary physician determines that I
am unable to make my own health-care decisions unless I mark the following box. If I mark this
box [ ], my agent’s authority to make health-care decisions for me takes effect immediately.”
Id.
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“proxy decision-maker of last resort,”137 there may be other options besides
relying on the last resort.
The Oklahoma legislature could rectify this problem by adding a list of
decision makers in priority order to the life-sustaining treatment portion of the
ADA, as opposed to limiting such a list to the experimental treatment
section.138 The benefit of this solution is the certainty that would result.
Everyone would know exactly who has the authority to speak on behalf of a
nondeclarant. Counterbalancing the benefit of certainty, however, is the
consequence such a solution would have on the effect the ADA has on a
nondeclarant. Currently, the ADA does not presume a nondeclarant wants or
does not want life-sustaining treatment.139 This lack of a presumption
guarantees that the nondeclarant will continue to receive life-sustaining
treatment. If interested parties were allowed to have the final say as a matter
of course, the ADA would not offer the same protection to nondeclarants. In
effect, such a change might require an individual to execute an ADHC in
order to ensure she receives life-sustaining treatment upon incapacity.
Shifting the burden of executing documents to maintain life may not be the
best course of action.
A more moderate solution would create a rebuttable presumption in regard
to the nondeclarant’s wishes based on the testimony of interested individuals.
Under this solution, the court would still be the proxy decision maker for
nondeclarants, but there would be a procedural method for interested
individuals to speak and to be heard.140 The evidence and views of the
interested individuals would create only a rebuttable presumption of the
nondeclarant’s wishes, so the individuals would not have the final say in the
nondeclarant’s care situation. Moreover, because multiple individuals would
have the opportunity to speak in such a proceeding, the rights of the
137. Act of May 17, 2006, § 4, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 733 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.2(A)(3)).
138. The particular contents and order of such a list are outside the scope of this discussion,
but are important questions.
139. See supra text accompanying note 14.
140. Considering the nature of the life-and-death interests at stake, this procedural protection
might also benefit from an expedited scheduling and action. A format for such an expedited
process can be found in timing requirements provided in judicial bypass options available for
minors seeking abortions. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (2005) (“Court
proceedings under this section . . . shall be given such precedence over other pending matters
as is necessary to insure that the court may reach a decision promptly, but in no case shall the
court fail to rule within seventy-two (72) hours of the time the application is filed.”) Despite
potential complications with court docket scheduling, this requirement would insure the court’s
decision as proxy decision maker of last resort would be reached in a timely manner, which is
especially important when considering these life and death matters.
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nondeclarant would be better protected than under the first solution discussed
above. Furthermore, this solution would permit currently incapacitated
individuals — those that cannot execute an ADHC — to speak through
interested individuals. This solution attempts to balance the tension between
protecting a nondeclarant’s rights to treatment and providing her with a voice
in her treatment decisions.
V. Until We Get There: Suggestions for Practitioners Offering
the ADHC to Clients
As previously discussed, the ADA and ADHC are deficient with respect to
clarity and flexibility. The practical danger of these deficiencies is that a
client’s desires may not be honored. This result may occur because of
insufficient clarity to communicate the client’s decisions or insufficient
flexibility to allow for the client’s actual choice, or because the document is
not given appropriate legal effect. The Oklahoma legislature should clarify
and improve the statute and form. Nevertheless, there are individuals
currently in need of the planning options the ADA offers who may not be able
to wait for a legislative solution. This section will suggest several methods
legal practitioners should use to maximize the ADHC’s effectiveness in
communicating their clients’ decisions to medical personnel and to ensure that
the document will be given its proper legal effect.
A. Explaining the ADHC to Clients
The first suggestion for legal practitioners utilizing the ADHC is to ensure
that the client fully understands the issues at stake and the nature of the
document.
Clients cannot make informed decisions without fully
understanding all of the facts. A client’s understanding of when the document
is effective is of particular importance. Legal practitioners should
communicate that the document is only effective when the client’s “attending
physician and another physician determine that [the client is] no longer able
to make decisions regarding [her] medical treatment,”141 and when a triggering
situation covered by the instructions in the ADHC has occurred.142 The client
must also understand the limited nature of appointing a Proxy, both in scope
of authority and as to when the grant becomes effective. A legal practitioner
should inform the client of the availability of the DPOA grant to provide for
situations the Proxy grant does not cover. When the client understands these

141. Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
142. Id., 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 736-37.
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limitations, then the legal practitioner may choose to proceed with the next
suggestion.
B. Alterations to the Documents
The ADA provides that the ADHC “may be in substantially the following
form” prior to laying out the statutory form.143 Therefore, the legal
practitioner should be able to modify the form somewhat to achieve the clarity
and flexibility that may be lacking.144 Remember, however, that the form
ought to remain recognizable and easily interpreted by medical professionals.
Several specific options may be beneficial to increase clarity and flexibility.
The best option for increasing clarity is to actually use the fourth part of the
Living Will, which allows declarants to “describe other conditions . . . [or]
give more specific instructions.”145 The declarant might use this section to
describe her understanding of the standard of capacity or the triggering
situations. The declarant could even include examples of situations in which
she would want the life-sustaining treatment instructions given in the first
three parts of the Living Will to be followed. One simple option for
increasing flexibility in the document is to reinsert the conflict resolution
provision. This would allow the declarant to choose whether her instructions
or the Proxy’s decision would control in the situation. This reinsertion could
be made either in the Proxy section of the ADHC or in the fourth part of the
Living Will. Making these alterations to a statutory form will definitely entail
more work and individualized drafting. In consideration of the matters at
stake, however, such extra work is surely worthwhile.
VI. Conclusion
The complexity involved in applying an individual’s right to refuse
treatment, even life-sustaining treatment, to specific life situations requires a
statutory scheme that is both clear and flexible. Unfortunately, for the citizens
of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma ADA is ambiguous and inflexible. It is
imperative that Oklahoma correct the ADA to give greater choice to those who
143. Id., 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 735 (emphasis added).
144. See 36 Okla. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 06-7, ¶¶ 4-9 (Apr. 6, 2006), 2006 WL 981042 (stating
that the form set out in the statute is merely a guideline and that any form with the same
elements will serve the same purpose). But see Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess.
Laws at 735 (to be codified at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3101.4(B)) (providing that an ADHC not in
the form set out in the statute will be ineffective as to the withdrawal or withholding of nutrition
and hydration unless it specifically addresses that issue in either the declarant’s own words or
a separately identified section of the document)
145. Act of May 17, 2006, § 6, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 738 (to be codified at 63 OKLA.
STAT. § 3101.4(C)).
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cannot choose for themselves. Until such corrective action occurs, legal
practitioners should attempt to give their clients the greatest clarity and
flexibility possible under the current statutory scheme.
Matthew B. Hickey
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